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ABSTRACT: Medicare’s benefit structure leaves beneficiaries with significant out-of-pocket 
costs, particularly if they lack supplemental coverage; such costs disproportionately affect low-
income, old, and chronically ill beneficiaries. Supplemental coverage can offset Medicare’s cost-
sharing but is itself a significant expense. This report analyzes the extent to which incentives for 
private saving could relieve the burden of post-retirement health care costs. Focusing on low-
income participants as part of a broader analysis of families of varying income levels, the analysis 
projects the savings potential for individuals if they could save a modest percentage of their 
income tax free and receive a rate of return equivalent to that in a basket of U.S. Treasury bonds. 
The authors conclude that enhanced savings offer only a partial solution to this problem for low-
income seniors, and that a strong fiscal case can be made for partly or totally limiting such tax 
incentives to low-income and lower-middle-income individuals. 
 
 
 
 
Support for this research was provided by The Commonwealth Fund. The views presented here are 
those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Commonwealth Fund or its directors, officers, 
or staff. This and other Fund publications are available online at www.commonwealthfund.org. 
To learn more about new publications when they become available, visit the Fund’s Web site and 
register to receive e-mail alerts. Commonwealth Fund pub. no. 1113. 
 
  
 
 CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................v 
About the Authors.............................................................................................................. vi 
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................. vii 
Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... viii 
Background..........................................................................................................................1 
Prefunding Alternatives for Medicare Out-of-Pocket Costs................................................2 
How This Study Was Conducted...................................................................................3 
Projected Out-of-Pocket Costs for Medicare Beneficiaries.................................................4 
Potential Impact of Tax-Free Prefunding ............................................................................6 
Projected Holdings.........................................................................................................8 
Account Holdings vs. Medical Costs...........................................................................10 
Prefunded Accounts in the Context of Other Retirement Savings ....................................13 
Projecting “Take-Up” of a Prefunding Option ..................................................................16 
Budgetary Considerations..................................................................................................18 
Conclusions........................................................................................................................19 
Appendix A. Detailed Projections of Contributions and Holdings....................................21 
Appendix B. Detailed Projections of Holdings vs. Costs ..................................................24 
Notes ..................................................................................................................................28 
 
 
 iii
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending, 
for All Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Up ...........................................5 
Figure 2 Average Annual Supplemental Medigap Plan F Premium 
for Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Up .................................................5 
Figure 3 Medicare Beneficiaries Without Supplemental Coverage, 2002.................6 
Figure 4a Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending in 2003, 
for Poor and Middle-Income Individuals.....................................................7 
Figure 4b Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending as a Percentage 
of Income in 2003, for Poor and Middle-Income Individuals .....................7 
Figure 5 How Projected Account Holdings at Age 65 Vary for 
Poor- and Middle-Income Individuals .........................................................9 
Figure 6 Pretax Account Contributions With and Without 
Low-Income Subsidy .................................................................................10 
Figure 7 Prefunded Account Holdings vs. Annual Medical Costs 
in 2021, by Income Level ..........................................................................11 
Figure 8 Account Holdings vs. Costs: The Difference Between 
Accounts Opened at Age 50 and at Age 60 ...............................................13 
Figure 9a Participation in IRA or 401(k)-Type Plans, by Income Quintile...............14 
Figure 9b Participation in IRA or 401(k)-Type Plans Relative to Poverty Level......14 
Figure 10a Average Retirement Account Holdings for Individuals 
Ages 55 to 69, by Income Quintile, 2004 ..................................................15 
Figure 10b Estimated Average Retirement Account Holdings 
for Individuals Ages 55 to 69, by Income Quintile ...................................15 
Figure A-1 Projected Holdings at Age 65 by Percentage of FPL 
and Under Alternative Assumptions..........................................................24 
Figure B-1 Subsidized Account Holdings and Average Annual Costs 
for Individuals Under 100% of Federal Poverty Level..............................25 
Figure B-2 Subsidized Account Holdings and Average Annual Costs 
for Individuals at 100%–149% of Federal Poverty Level .........................26 
 
 iv
 Figure B-3 Unsubsidized Account Holdings and Average Annual Costs 
for Individuals at 150%–199% of Federal Poverty Level .........................26 
Figure B-4 Unsubsidized Account Holdings and Average Annual Costs 
for Individuals at 200%–300% of Federal Poverty Level .........................27 
Figure B-5 Unsubsidized Account Holdings and Average Annual Costs 
for Individuals Above 300% of Federal Poverty Level .............................27 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 Distribution of Individual Income Tax Returns and Earnings, 
by Statutory Marginal Tax Bracket, 2005..................................................18 
Table A-1a Average Annual Pretax Contribution by Income Level ............................21 
Table A-1b Accumulated Pretax Contribution by Income Level .................................22 
Table B-1a Full Prefunded Account Projections Under 5-Year 
Investment Scenario by Income, and Investment Rate..............................25 
Table B-1b Full Prefunded Account Projections Under 15-Year 
Investment Scenario by Income, and Investment Rate..............................25 
 
 v
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
 
Eliot Fishman, Ph.D., is vice president for research and health policy at Metropolitan 
Jewish Health System. Formerly, Dr. Fishman was a senior health policy analyst with the 
law firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, where he specialized in state health issues. He is 
the author of Running in Place: How the Medicaid Model Falls Short and What to Do 
About It (Century Foundation Press, 2002) and has written for the Washington Post and 
Health Affairs, among other publications. Dr. Fishman earned his doctorate in 1999 from 
Yale University. He can be contacted at efishman@mjhs.org. 
 
Suzanne Tamang, M.S., is a research associate at the Department of Research at 
Metropolitan Jewish Health System. Her research interests include health information 
technology, quality improvement and long-term care policy. Ms. Tamang received her 
master of science from Brooklyn College and is a doctoral student in computer science at 
the City University of New York. Ms. Tamang can be contacted at stamang@mjhs.org. 
 
Dennis Shea, Ph.D., is professor and chair of the Department of Health Policy and 
Administration at Pennsylvania State University. His primary field of study is in health 
economics and the economics of aging. The focus of his research includes inequality in 
health and economic resources among the elderly, health insurance coverage of older 
persons, and economic and financing policy issues in long-term care and mental health 
care. His most recent research considers Medicare prescription drug coverage, inequality 
in health and well-being, and aging and mental health policy. Previously, he held 
associate professorships at the College of Health and Human Development and was a 
senior research associate with the Center for Health Policy Research. He received his 
doctorate in economics from Rutgers University. He can be contacted at dshea@psu.edu. 
 
 
 vi
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Daniel Zenilman for his 
research assistance, and support developing the final stages of the report. 
 
We thank members of The Commonwealth Fund for their review, thoughtful 
comments, and assistance with editing, production, and dissemination. We particularly 
thank the following staff, present and past, of the Fund’s Program on Medicare’s Future: 
Stuart Guterman, senior project director; Barbara S. Cooper, former director; Michelle 
Serber, former program assistant; and Sophie Kasimow, program assistant. Finally, we 
thank Chris Hollander, the Fund’s associate communications director. 
 
 
Editorial support was provided by Paul Berk. 
 
 vii
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Medicare’s benefit structure leaves beneficiaries with significant out-of-pocket 
costs, particularly if they lack supplemental coverage. Out-of-pocket costs 
disproportionately affect low-income, old, and chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries: in 
2003, the elderly with incomes under 135 percent of federal poverty level (FPL) spent 
one-third of their income on uncovered medical care, on average. Individuals of all 
incomes with fair or poor health status or age 85 and older spent almost 30 percent. (The 
2007 Federal Poverty Level is $10,787 for a nonelderly adult and $9,944 for an elderly 
adult.) Although Medicare added an outpatient prescription drug benefit in 2006, poor 
and sick beneficiaries still face a substantial cost burden. 
 
Supplemental coverage is a way to offset Medicare’s cost-sharing requirements, 
but it is itself typically a significant expense. The poor, ill, and “oldest old”—that is, the 
same populations that face the highest out-of-pocket expenses—have particularly poor 
access to Medicare supplemental coverage. Low-income individuals disproportionately 
lack retiree benefits from former employers and typically cannot afford Medigap 
premiums, while the oldest old and those with chronic conditions will often be turned 
down for affordable Medigap coverage and may hesitate to enroll in managed care plans 
because of their more acute need for access to specific providers. Lack of supplemental 
coverage is associated with reduced access to care: beneficiaries without such coverage 
are less likely to have a physician as a regular source of care, more likely to delay care 
because of cost, and less likely to receive standard preventive care. Uncovered long-term 
care costs also have significant negative effects on many Medicare beneficiaries and their 
families. The great majority of Medicare beneficiaries must rely on their own income and 
savings to pay for long-term in-home assistance. Nursing home costs are also a major 
medical burden for Medicare beneficiaries. While Medicaid guarantees virtually 
universal access to nursing home care, Medicaid eligibility imposes catastrophic financial 
costs on many Medicare beneficiaries. 
 
As a possible solution to the out-of-pocket cost burden on the elderly, incentives 
for private saving have considerable appeal. Recent proposals from both parties in related 
policy areas have centered on tax incentives for saving during working-age years, 
including Health Savings Accounts and subsidized or tax-advantaged long-term care 
insurance. Private savings may seem to be the most realistic path for doing something to 
address the growing problem of post-retirement medical expenses, particularly given 
competing budget priorities such as the Medicare drug benefit and the renewed focus on 
the nonelderly uninsured. 
 viii
 This report analyzes the extent to which incentives to save could offer significant 
relief of post-retirement healthcare costs. We analyze this with a particular focus on low-
income participants as part of a broader analysis of families of varying income levels. We 
include projections of savings potential for individuals of varying income levels if they 
could save a modest percentage of their income tax free and receive a rate of return 
equivalent to that in a basket of U.S. Treasury bonds. (We provide the main findings from 
this analysis in the body of the report as well as more detailed charts and tables in 
Appendices A and B.) We also add an analysis of the potential impact of a moderately 
sized government match for low-income beneficiaries, using the Earned Income Tax 
Credit as a rough guide for potential subsidy levels. We look at current IRA/401(k) 
participation by income level both to project possible participation rates in an 
incentivized savings program and to examine the impact of matching subsidies on low-
income participation. 
 
Several key analytical conclusions emerge from this discussion. 
 
• The problem of uncovered out-of-pocket costs is predominantly a problem of 
low-income individuals. Low-income seniors actually have lower medical costs 
on average than other seniors, but they have far fewer cash and insurance 
resources to apply to them. Medicare beneficiaries with an income less than 135 
percent FPL spend 33 percent of their annual income on out-of-pocket health care 
costs, on average, while those above 200 percent FPL spend only 12 percent. 
 
• Enhanced savings offer only a partial solution to this problem for low-income 
seniors. Even with a matching subsidy, low-income individuals who saved 1 
percent of their income tax free from age 50 on would on average save enough to 
pay for about a year of Medigap for poor and near-poor seniors (incomes under 
150% FPL), and three years of Medigap for lower-middle-income seniors. 
Because their preretirement incomes are low on average, helping low-income 
individuals to save will not fully address the problem of out-of pocket medical 
costs for the low-income elderly. Nevertheless, particularly given the low savings 
levels of the poor and near poor, savings on the order of 1 percent of income 
could make a real difference in relative terms. 
 
• A policy allowing near-retirees to save for post-retirement medical expenses 
tax free is likely to appeal to both low-income and higher-income individuals. 
Low-income and lower-middle-income populations do participate in appreciable 
numbers in tax-advantaged retirement savings in their 50s and 60s, while higher 
 ix
 income populations participate in these programs at higher rates. If patterns from 
other savings incentives programs would hold for a similar program targeted at 
medical costs, between 20 percent and 40 percent of low-income people would 
participate, with participation on the higher end of that range among those with 
incomes between 150 percent and 300 percent FPL. There is evidence that a 
public matching subsidy would be a critical element to attracting low-income 
participation. Participation rates for individuals with average and higher incomes 
are likely to be 50 percent or more. 
 
• There is a strong fiscal case for partly or totally limiting any tax incentives 
for post-retirement medical costs to low-income and lower-middle-income 
individuals. The policy problem of uncovered post-retirement medical costs is far 
more acute in this population. A universal option to save a percentage of income 
for post-retirement medical costs tax free would cost $18 in lost tax revenue for 
every dollar saved. In contrast, allowing only those with incomes of 300 percent 
FPL or less to shelter savings from taxation would reduce the tax revenue loss to 
the federal budget to $8 of every $100 saved. A more modest form of means 
testing would allow tax incentives to apply almost universally but still reduce 
costs: applying the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to income saved and 
denying eligibility for the highest 3 percent of earners who do not pay the AMT 
would reduce the percentage of total income potentially subject to sheltering by 
about 38 percent, and would reduce budgetary impacts by close to 50 percent. 
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 MEDICARE OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS: 
CAN PRIVATE SAVINGS INCENTIVES SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
 
 
Background 
Out-of-pocket medical costs for Medicare beneficiaries are significant, often 
disproportionately hurting low-income beneficiaries. In 2003, beneficiaries with incomes 
under 135 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) spent one-third of their income on 
uncovered medical care, on average, while beneficiaries of all incomes with fair or poor 
health status or age 85 and older spent almost 30 percent.1 (The 2007 Federal Poverty 
Level is $10,787 for a nonelderly adult and $9,944 for an elderly adult.) Although 
Medicare added an outpatient prescription drug benefit in 2006, poor and sick 
beneficiaries still face a substantial cost burden.2
 
Medicare beneficiaries have access, in principle, to multiple sources of 
supplemental or “wraparound” coverage for these costs: they may receive retiree benefits 
from a former employer; they may enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan (formerly known 
as Medicare managed care plans); or they may pay for a stand-alone insurance product 
known as Medigap. While supplemental coverage can be a means to reduce the impact of 
out-of-pocket costs, the poor, ill, and “oldest old” populations—that is, the same 
populations that face the highest out-of-pocket expenses—have particularly poor access 
to Medicare supplemental coverage. Low-income individuals disproportionately lack 
retiree benefits from former employers and typically cannot afford Medigap premiums.3 
Medigap insurance is sold to beneficiaries at varying premiums through private insurance 
companies. The oldest old and those with chronic conditions will often be turned down for 
affordable Medigap coverage and may hesitate to enroll in managed care plans because 
of their more acute need for access to specific providers.4 Lack of supplemental coverage 
is associated with reduced access to care using several measures, including whether 
beneficiaries have a physician as a regular source of care, whether they are likely to delay 
care because of cost, and whether they receive standard preventive care measures.5
 
Uncovered long-term care costs also have significant negative effects on many 
Medicare beneficiaries and their families. Following implementation of prospective 
payment in Medicare’s Home Health benefit, long-term paid home care is predominantly 
financed either with Medicaid and/or with private, out-of-pocket payment.6 With fewer 
than 20 percent of Medicare’s enrollees covered by Medicaid, the great majority of 
Medicare beneficiaries must rely on their own income and savings to pay for in-home 
assistance. Nursing home costs are also a major medical burden. While Medicaid 
guarantees virtually universal access to nursing home care, Medicaid eligibility imposes 
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 catastrophic financial costs on many Medicare beneficiaries. Fifty percent of nursing 
home residents once had financial resources that they subsequently lost trying to “spend 
down” to become eligible for Medicaid, and more than 6 percent of all elderly people will 
become impoverished by catastrophic nursing home costs.7
 
Prefunding Alternatives for Medicare Out-of-Pocket Costs 
As a possible solution to the out-of-pocket cost burden on the elderly, incentives for 
private saving have considerable appeal. Recent proposals from both parties in related 
policy areas have centered on tax incentives for saving during working-age years, 
including Health Savings Accounts and subsidized or tax-advantaged long-term care 
insurance. Private savings may seem to be the most realistic path for doing something to 
address the growing problem of post-retirement medical expenses, particularly given 
competing federal and state budget priorities such as the Medicare drug benefit and the 
renewed focus on the nonelderly uninsured. 
 
This report analyzes the extent to which tax incentives to save could significantly 
reduce post-retirement healthcare costs. If individuals were allowed to save a modest 
percentage of income tax free for the specific purpose of prefunding their future out-of-
pocket medical costs, how much of an impact would these savings have? 
 
To conduct this analysis, we used several assumptions to construct a reasonable 
and potentially appealing tax incentive policy and than analyze its impacts. We assumed 
individuals would be allowed to save up to 1 percent of income, and would begin saving 
at no younger than age 50 (and perhaps as late as age 60). Accumulated contributions and 
earnings would be held in a virtual or actual “account,” which would become available to 
the individual at age 65 to pay Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) and 
Part D (Prescription Drug Coverage) premiums, long-term care expenses, and other out-
of-pocket health-related costs. The accumulated account value, when applied to 
appropriate expenses, would be tax free upon withdrawal. We assumed a rate of return 
for the accounts equivalent to that in a basket of U.S. Treasury bonds similar to that used 
for the Medicare and Social Security Trust Funds. Indeed, one way to structure these 
accounts to make participation easy and to reduce fees to third-party account 
administrators would be simply to allow individuals to supplement their Medicare FICA 
withholding and have their “account” invested in the Medicare Trust Fund. 8
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 How This Study Was Conducted 
 
To lay out the scope of the medical cost burden faced by Medicare beneficiaries, we use the most 
recent published sources to identify current per beneficiary costs and then inflate them to project 
future costs.9 We use the Medicare Trustees’ Reports to calculate the impact of medical inflation 
on future health care costs. To project how average out-of-pocket costs will look in 2011 and 
2021, when our cohorts will turn 65, we inflate our most recent cost estimates at a rate of 5.1 
percent per year, reflecting the intermediate medical inflation projection of the Medicare 
Trustees.10 We apply the inflation formula across all cost categories, although our base year 
varied from 2002 to 2005. 
 
To project average savings that would be accumulated if individuals were allowed to save up to 1 
percent of income tax free for post-retirement medical costs, we assume rates of return equivalent 
to the Medicare Trust Fund, using the Medicare Trustees’ Reports intermediate rates of return for 
the Medicare Trust Fund for the years 2006 to 2021. We project total savings at age 65 for 
individuals of varying income levels under two pairs of assumptions: one for how long they might 
invest (starting at age 50 or at age 60) and the second for how much of their income they would 
invest (0.5% of pretax income or the maximum of 1%). We generate estimated savings at 65 for 
individuals in the following preretirement income level categories: less than 100 percent of the 
federal poverty level (FPL), 100 to 149, 150 to 199, 200 to 299, and greater than 300 percent FPL. 
Our focus is on low-income and lower-middle-income individuals (about one-third of individuals 
ages 50 to 65 have incomes less than 300 percent FPL.)11 We utilized 2002 data from the biennial 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) of individuals age 50 and older to generate anticipated dollar 
inputs into a tax-free account from age of initial investment until retirement, and select a “program 
start year” (that is, the year when participants would begin prefunding) of 2007. We also added an 
analysis of the potential impact of a moderately sized government match for low-income 
beneficiaries, using the Earned Income Tax Credit as a rough guide for potential subsidy levels.12
 
To analyze the potential impact of tax-free prefunding as a way to pay for the post-retirement 
health-related costs of participants, we look at future uncovered costs and evaluate how different 
levels of prefunding would offset them. We discuss how the ability to save 0.5 percent or 1 
percent of pretax income for this purpose could impact retirees’ ability to pay for Medicare 
supplemental policies following retirement or, alternatively, to pay for out-of-pocket costs 
directly. We are particularly interested in benefits for individuals with low incomes. 
 
To describe how participation in the prefunding mechanism would affect overall retirement 
savings at different income levels, we draw from the HRS to determine mean and median IRA 
and 401(k) plan holdings and the Survey of Income and Program Participation for IRA and 
401(k) plan participation rates. To project average accumulated preretirement wealth by income 
level, we use financial projections from nationally representative data from the 1992–2002 HRS 
published by the Urban Institute, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation for IRA 
and 401(k) participation rates.13
 
To explain possible participation rates for individuals of varying incomes in a tax-advantaged 
savings mechanism for out-of pocket medical costs, we look at participation rates in IRAs and 
401(k) plans. 
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 A potential enhancement to this structure would be a public match for low-income 
individuals: the government would match 25 percent of annual contributions for individuals 
with incomes 100 to 149 percent FPL and 50 percent for individuals with annual incomes 
less than 100 percent FPL. We used the Earned Income Tax Credit as a rough guide for 
potential subsidy levels. We look at current IRA/401(k) participation by income level both 
to project possible participation rates in an incentivized savings program and to examine 
the impact of matching subsidies on low-income participation. 
 
To sum, rather than evaluating prefunding incentives as a way to address out-of-
pocket medical costs for retirees strictly as a concept, we look at the projected impacts 
of a more specific tax-incentive structure that is representative of the political appeal 
of prefunding incentives. (See the box below for further detail on the methods used for 
this analysis.) 
 
Projected Out-of-Pocket Costs for Medicare Beneficiaries 
As with current Medicare beneficiaries, future Medicare beneficiaries face substantial 
out-of-pocket costs above and beyond what Medicare covers. We break out these costs 
for people who will turn 65 years old in 2011 and those who will turn 65 in 2021 (that is, 
people who were 50 or 60 at the beginning of 2007). Adjusting our base year, 2003, for 
medical inflation, we project that average out-of-pocket costs for Medicare beneficiaries 
will be $5,114 in 2011, increasing to $8,459 by 2021 (Figure 1).14 Figure 2 shows the 
projected increase in out-of-pocket Medigap Plan F premiums from 2005 to 2011 and 
to 2021.15,16
 
Notably, these figures exclude most long-term care costs (they include only 
rehabilitative skilled nursing facility care and home health care, excluding in-home 
personal care, assisted living, and custodial nursing home care). As described in our 
background section, many elderly households must pay out of pocket for most or all of 
their long-term care needs. Average estimates for these out-of-pocket costs in 2004 vary 
from between about $650 to about $1250 per elderly Medicare beneficiary per year.17 
Since these cost estimates overlap only slightly with the out-of-pocket health care costs 
described above and in Figure 1, average out-of-pocket costs for all health-related needs 
are about 20 to 30 percent higher than those charted in Figure 1 (and in similar figures 
throughout the rest of the report) when long-term care costs are taken into account. 
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 Figure 1. Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending, 
for All Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Up
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Figure 2. Average Annual Supplemental Medigap Plan F 
Premium for Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Up
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An estimated 12 percent of Medicare beneficiaries do not have any supplemental 
insurance coverage to assist in the payment of services currently not covered by Medicare, 
and sources of coverage vary considerably with income.18 Figure 3 shows that 13 percent of 
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 beneficiaries with annual household incomes of $10,000 or less and 17 percent of 
beneficiaries with incomes between $10,001 and $20,000 have no supplemental coverage, 
while only 6 percent of those with incomes of $40,000 lack additional coverage. 
 
Figure 3. Medicare Beneficiaries Without 
Supplemental Coverage, 2002
12% 13%
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In addition, individuals in lower income brackets pay a higher percent of total 
annual income for out-of-pocket costs than those with higher annual incomes. Medicare 
beneficiaries with an income less than 135 percent FPL spend 33 percent of their annual 
income on out-of-pocket health care costs, on average, while those above 200 percent FPL 
spend only 12 percent.19 This is true despite the lower nominal out-of-pocket costs faced 
by low-income seniors. As illustrated by Figures 4a and 4b, low-income seniors have 
lower costs on average, but have far fewer cash and insurance resources to apply to them. 
 
Potential Impact of Tax-Free Prefunding 
As a possible solution to the out-of-pocket cost burden on the elderly, incentives for 
private saving have considerable appeal. Recent proposals from both parties in related 
policy areas have centered on tax incentives for saving during working-age years, 
including Health Savings Accounts and subsidized or tax-advantaged long-term care 
insurance. Private savings may seem to be the most realistic path for doing something to 
address the growing problem of post-retirement medical expenses, particularly given 
competing budget priorities such as the Medicare drug benefit and the renewed focus on 
the nonelderly uninsured. 
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 Figure 4a. Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending
in 2003, for Poor and Middle-Income Individuals
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Figure 4b. Average Out-of-Pocket Health Care
Spending as a Percentage of Income in 2003,
for Poor and Middle-Income Individuals
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If individuals were allowed to save a modest percentage of income tax free for the 
specific purpose of prefunding their future out-of-pocket medical costs, how much of an 
impact would these savings have? To conduct this analysis, we used several assumptions 
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 to construct a reasonable and potentially appealing tax incentive policy and than analyze 
its impacts. (We provide the main findings from this analysis in the body of the report as 
well as more detailed charts and tables in Appendices A and B.) We assumed individuals 
would be allowed to save up to 1 percent of income, and would begin saving at no 
younger than age 50 (and perhaps as late as age 60). Accumulated contributions and 
earnings would be held in a virtual or actual “account,” which would become available to 
the individual at age 65 to pay Medicare Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance) and 
Part D (Prescription Drug Coverage) premiums, long-term care expenses, and other out-
of-pocket health-related costs. The accumulated account value, when applied to 
appropriate expenses, would be tax free upon withdrawal. Accumulated contributions and 
earnings would be available to the individual at age 65 to pay Medicare supplemental 
costs or other health-related expenses. 
 
As a reminder, we assumed a rate of return for the accounts equivalent to that in a 
basket of U.S. Treasury bonds similar to that used for the Medicare and Social Security 
Trust Funds. Indeed, one way to structure a prefunding mechanism to make participation 
easy and to reduce fees to third-party account administrators would be simply to allow 
individuals to supplement their Medicare FICA withholding and have their “account” 
invested in the Medicare Trust Fund.20
 
In this section, we perform two analyses of this prefunding mechanism. First, we 
project how much money individuals with different preretirement incomes are projected 
to accrue. Second, we compare projected health-related costs with the amounts 
accumulated in the accounts. 
 
Projected Holdings 
As with our projections of future retiree health care costs above, we explore two 
alternatives for ages at which participants could begin to save a percentage of pretax 
income—at age 50 and age 60. We therefore estimate contributions over two periods: 
2007 to 2011 (five years) for those starting at 60 and 2007 to 2021 (15 years) for those 
starting at 50.21 We projected holdings at 65 for people contributing 1 percent of pretax 
income or 0.5 percent of income. We then multiply the principal and any accrued interest 
by the compounded rate of return of the Medicare Part A Trust Fund under the Trustees’ 
most recent intermediate rate projections. In Appendix A, we report all of the above 
permutations. We also report our raw data—year-by-year projections of annual 
contributions and compounded accumulated account totals. 
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 There are two key dynamics at work in these projections: 
 
First, while the Medicare Trustees project 5.1 percent annual medical inflation, 
they project slightly less than 5.9 percent annual returns for the Trust Fund. That is, the 
Medicare Trust Fund is currently projected to increase 0.8 percent faster than underlying 
medical inflation. 
 
Second, unsubsidized savings levels directly reflect preretirement income. As a 
result, projected account holdings vary by over 500 percent between poor individuals 
(<100% FPL) and lower middle-income individuals (200–299% FPL), with middle- to 
higher-income persons (>300% FPL) in turn holding about three times as much on 
average as lower-middle-income individuals. Figure 5 shows average projected holdings 
in 2021 (that is, at age 65) for individuals of different income levels who were age 50 
in 2007. 
 
Figure 5. How Projected Account Holdings at Age 65
Vary for Poor- and Middle-Income Individuals
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As described above, out-of-pocket medical costs for the elderly represent more 
than 25 percent of income for poor and near-poor individuals on average, and much less 
as a percentage of income for higher-income individuals. The severe needs of low-
income beneficiaries accentuate the already regressive impacts of a universal tax 
incentive. A public matching subsidy for low-income contributors could help to mitigate 
this problem. We use the Earned Income Tax Credit as a rough guide for possible subsidy 
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 levels for low-income beneficiaries. Following the EITC phase-out in simplified form, 
we built in a 50 percent match on all contributions made by individuals with incomes at 
Federal Poverty Level or less and a 25 percent match on all contributions made by 
individuals with incomes between 100 and 149 percent FPL. (Presumably, the actual 
phase out from a 50 percent match to a 25 percent match would be less abrupt.) 
Approximately 15 percent of the population ages 50 to 64 has an income in this range and 
would be eligible for such a subsidy. For income eligible beneficiaries, Figure 6 lays out 
the impact of this low-income subsidy on accrued account holdings at retirement. 
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$3,000
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$6,000
$7,000
<100% of poverty* 100-149% of poverty**
5 yr .5% unsubsidized 5 yr .5% w/ low income subsidy
15 yr .5% unsubsidized 15 yr .5% w/ low income subsidy
 5 yr 1% unsubsidized  5 yr 1% w/ low income subsidy
15 yr 1% unsubsidized 15 yr 1% w/ low income subsidy
Figure 6. Pretax Account Contributions
With and Without Low-Income Subsidy
Accumulated under 5- and 15-year investment scenarios
* 50% annual subsidization level
** 25% annual subsidization level.  
 
The detailed projected holdings for various low- and middle-income levels under 
these permutations are laid out in Appendix A. 
 
Account Holdings vs. Medical Costs 
We also compare projected health care costs with the amounts that would be accumulated 
with tax incentives under the different scenarios above. As illustrated, middle-income and 
higher-income individuals can be expected to accrue much more than lower-income 
individuals. While out-of-pocket medical spending also goes up somewhat with (post-
retirement) income, the variation is much less dramatic than variation in income itself. As 
a result, prefunding based on 0.5 or 1 percent of pretax income would provide 
substantially more protection for middle and high-income people than for low-income 
people. Middle- and higher-income individuals can accrue amounts sufficient to offset 
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 several years of out-of-pocket medical costs, while poor individuals accrue amounts 
insufficient to fund even one year of costs, and near-poor individuals accrue enough to 
fund about one to two years. Figure 7 compares two 15-year savings scenarios to 
Medigap and out-of-pocket costs in 2021. 
 
Figure 7. Prefunded Account Holdings vs.
Annual Medical Costs in 2021, by Income Level
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• Even with a low-income subsidy as described above, if an individual with an 
annual income less than 100 percent of the FPL invests 0.5 percent of pretax 
income for fifteen years, he or she will accrue $1,610 including interest. This 
would be inadequate to finance even one year of a Medigap premium and 
represents about three months of average annual projected out-of-pocket health 
care costs in 2021. One percent of pretax income with a matching subsidy for 15 
years would pay for a little less than a year of Medigap coverage. 
 
• Individuals with preretirement incomes between 100 and 149 percent of the FPL 
can finance nearly two years of Medigap Plan F with 1 percent of pretax income 
starting at age 50 with the help of a low-income subsidy. Lesser investment levels 
finance less than one year of supplemental coverage and less than six months of 
average out-of-pocket costs. 
 
• For individuals with preretirement incomes between 150 percent and 199 percent 
of poverty, 15 years of investing 1 percent of pretax income in a dedicated 
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 account would prefund about two years of Medigap premiums, or just under a 
year of average out-of-pocket costs. 
 
• For lower-middle-income individuals, our tax-free prefunding mechanism can 
offer enough savings to offset about a year of post-retirement medical costs or 
multiple years of supplemental coverage. For individuals with preretirement 
incomes between 200 percent and 300 percent FPL, investments of 1.0 percent for 
15 years can pay for three years of Medigap or over one year of average out-of-
pocket health costs. More modest investment levels yield less than one year of 
out-of-pocket costs or Medigap premiums. 
 
• For individuals with middle and high preretirement incomes—greater than 300 
percent FPL—more modest investment levels in tax-free accounts can yield 
several years of full offsets of supplemental costs or supplemental insurance 
premiums. 
 
For the low-income populations that have the most difficulty with Medicare out-
of-pocket costs, investment levels of less than 1 percent of income for 15 years do not 
make a substantial impact on post-retirement costs. Tax-free accounts initiated five years 
before retirement do not accrue substantial amounts for lower-income persons. Figure 8 
shows that for individuals with incomes between 150 and 199 percent FPL, an account 
begun at 60 has a minimal capacity to offset costs at 65 with 1 percent of income 
invested, while saving 1 percent of income tax free beginning at age 50 would make a 
modest but significant contribution towards post-retirement costs. 
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 Figure 8. Account Holdings vs. Costs: The Difference 
Between Accounts Opened at Age 50 and at Age 60
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Appendix B lays out all of the data that is summarized above in tabular form: 
average income levels, projected tax-free account holdings, and average out-of-pocket 
and supplemental premium costs for aged Medicare beneficiaries for all of the above 
income categories. In Appendix B, we also chart each of our income categories in greater 
detail, looking at premiums for Medicare supplemental and long-term care coverage and 
both medical out-of-pocket costs. We show how each of these potential costs would be 
offset by projected account holdings. 
 
Prefunded Accounts in the Context of Other Retirement Savings 
As detailed above, the option to save pretax dollars for post-retirement health costs would 
have small impacts for low-income individuals. One important caveat to this finding is 
that even though prefunding would not offset a large proportion of their medical costs, 
prefunding would dramatically boost retirement savings for lower income individuals 
who were able to participate. Because average liquid savings at retirement for low-
income people are very limited, and because uncovered medical costs represent a high 
percentage of their income, even the modest amounts they would accrue if they 
participated in a pretax account would dramatically increase their ability to finance out of 
pocket costs in relative terms. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 9a, participation in IRA/401(k)s is highly correlated with 
income. Figure 9b (derived from a different survey than Figure 9a and hence with slightly 
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 different age ranges) shows similar variation in IRA/401(k) participation by income with 
income categories between 0 and 300 percent FPL (the bottom 40 percent of the income 
distribution) broken out in more detail.22
 
 
Figure 9a. Participation in IRA or 401(k)-Type Plans,
by Income Quintile
23.2%
36.2%
48.2%
59.1%
73.5%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
First
quintile
Second
quintile
Third
quintile
Fourth
quintile
Fifth
quintile
Percentage of individuals ages 55 to 64 in 2004
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation Study (2004, Wave 1).  
 
 
Figure 9b. Participation in IRA or 401(k)-Type Plans
Relative to Poverty Level
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 Figure 10a shows participation rates for 401(k) and IRA accounts for 55- to 69-
year-olds by income quintile; Figure 10b shows the average retirement account holdings 
(adding together IRA and 401(k)-type holdings) by income quintile. 
 
 
Figure 10a. Average Retirement Account Holdings
for Individuals Ages 55 to 69, by Income Quintile, 2004
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Figure 10b. Estimated Average Retirement Account Holdings
for Individuals Ages 55 to 69, by Income Quintile
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the 2000 Health and Retirement Study, and Johnson, Burman, Kobes (2004).  
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 The lowest income quintile in these charts equates to individuals with incomes 
ranging from zero to slightly above 150 percent FPL. As detailed above, these individuals 
would have several thousand dollars accumulated in a tax-free account if they contributed 
1 percent of income for 15 years and received a public matching subsidy, averaging over 
$3,000 for poor individuals and over $6,000 for those between 100 percent and 149 
percent FPL. Twenty-three percent of individuals in the lowest income quintile currently 
participate in IRAs and 401(k)-type plans. Among those who participate, median 
combined holdings are just over $10,000. Although—even investing a full 1 percent of 
income for 15 years—holdings are small relative to looming post-retirement out-of-
pocket medical and long-term care costs, they could in principle augment by 30 to 60 
percent other retirement savings for poor and near-poor persons, on average. 
 
For individuals with preretirement incomes between 150 percent FPL and 300 
percent FPL—roughly the second income quintile—approximately 30 to 35 percent 
participate in an IRA or 401(k)-type plan. Among these participants, IRA/401(k) 
holdings average $25,600. Accounts based on 1 percent of pretax income, as detailed 
above, would average about $10,000 for this group: as with the poor and near-poor 
group, accounts dedicated to out-of-pocket health costs could in principle significantly 
augment retirement savings. 
 
These figures, however, come with a major caveat. As described below, 
projecting a quantitative relationship between participation in accounts dedicated to 
health costs and in IRA/401(k) plans would require a dynamic model that is beyond this 
report’s scope. But it is unlikely that saving for post-retirement health costs would be 
totally or even mostly additive to IRA/401(k) saving, particularly for low-income groups 
with little disposable income. 
 
Projecting “Take-Up” of a Prefunding Option 
Thus far, we have primarily discussed potential impacts of prefunding of health costs if 
people of varying incomes actually used a potential tax-free account option. Projecting 
whether individuals ages 50 to 65 would in fact take advantage of this option is 
inherently speculative. IRA/401(k) participation—also involving deferral of income until 
retirement—seems to be the best basis for projecting participation rates. The mechanism 
we have laid out would be more attractive than IRAs in some ways and less attractive in 
others: it would not be as flexible as an IRA or 401(k) in terms of post-retirement 
spending, but it would allow for tax-free deposits and redemptions, unlike IRAs and 
401(k)s, which are taxed upon redemption (or before deposit in the case of Roth IRAs). 
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 Throughout this analysis our focus has been on low-income individuals. If we 
assume enrollment in a health costs prefunding program would be similar to the general 
pattern we observe for participation by income in 401(k)-type plans, then low-income 
individuals will be the least likely to take advantage. Currently, IRA/401(k) participation 
rates among 50- to 65-year-olds are about 25 percent for the poor and about 30 percent 
for the near poor. Participation rates for those with middle incomes are 50 to 60 percent, 
and almost 80 percent of high-income individuals participate. 
 
As described above, the need for enhanced health savings is primarily among 
those with incomes in the lower two quintiles and particularly the lowest quintile. There 
is evidence to suggest that a public matching subsidy option would be a critical element 
to attracting low-income participation. A large randomized field experiment conducted 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research in collaboration with H&R Block showed 
that IRA take–up rates for low-income households increased from 3 percent for a control 
group with no matching subsidy, to 12 percent for a group with a 20 percent match, to 21 
percent for a group with a 50 percent matching subsidy.23 In addition, the incentivized 
groups contributed, on average, more than 40 percent more to their accounts. This 
evidence suggests that similar incentives would be necessary to attract low-income 
participants, and that a matching subsidy may serve as the critical factor for individuals 
with limited access to financial resources to financially prepare for post-retirement costs. 
With the matching subsidy option, it appears realistic that between 20 and 40 percent of 
low-income individuals would participate in a prefunding program, particularly for those 
with incomes between 150 and 300 percent FPL. Participation rates for individuals with 
average and higher incomes are likely to be 50 percent or more. 
 
It should be noted that the above analysis refers only to a simple participation 
rate. Projecting the amount of income that various income groups might commit to their 
post-retirement health costs, which would be critical to a projection of budgetary impact, 
would require a model to account for the potentially offsetting relationship between these 
and other retirement savings instruments. This is beyond the scope of this report. 
 
Nevertheless, the above figures capture several key analytical points: low-income 
and lower-middle-income populations do participate in appreciable numbers in tax-
advantaged retirement savings in their 50s and 60s, while higher-income populations 
participate in these programs at high rates. A policy allowing near-retirees to save for 
post-retirement medical expenses tax free and subsidized under income-based criteria is 
likely to appeal to both low-income and higher-income individuals. Particularly given the 
low savings levels of the poor and near-poor, having even a modest account dedicated to 
out-of-pocket costs could make a real difference in relative terms. 
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 Budgetary Considerations 
Though budgetary effects are not within the scope of this study, some important 
guidelines to thinking about them should be noted. While low- and middle-income 
households have the greatest need for a tax incentive to prefund health costs, most of the 
budgetary impact would depend upon the tax treatment and behavior of high-income 
households, who are subject to high marginal tax rates. 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, the majority of households face a marginal income tax 
rate of 15 percent, 10 percent, or zero. However, the minority of higher-income 
households would drive most revenue losses. This finding holds even if we assume that 
low-income groups would contribute an equal percentage of their income as would 
higher-income groups. If participation rates for different income groups followed 
IRA/401(k) participation rates and if they contributed an equal share of income, for every 
$100 saved in a tax-free account, approximately $18.50 of tax revenue would be lost. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Individual Income Tax Returns and Earnings, 
by Statutory Marginal Tax Bracket, 2005 
 Percentage of Taxpayers 
Facing the Rate 
Those Taxpayers’ Share 
of Total Earnings 
Statutory Marginal Rate   
0 19.7 3.8 
10 21.6 7.7 
15 36.9 33.8 
25 16.5 28.4 
28 2.1 6.1 
33 0.4 1.8 
35 0.4 7.5 
Alternative Minimum Tax 2.5 2.5 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Tax Policy Center. 
 
On the one hand, a matching low-income subsidy would have a minimal 
budgetary impact on the proposal as a whole, representing approximately 0.3 percent (or 
thirty cents out of every $100) of total invested dollars. On the other hand, applying the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to any income saved and denying eligibility for the 
highest 3 percent of earners who do not pay the AMT would reduce the percentage of 
total income potentially subject to sheltering by about 38 percent, and would reduce 
budgetary impacts by close to 50 percent when likely near-universal participation rates 
are accounted for in these high-income categories.24 Allowing only those with incomes of 
300 percent FPL or less to participate would reduce the tax revenue loss to $8 of every 
$100 invested in the program, on average. 
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 Conclusions 
Several key analytical conclusions emerge from this discussion. 
 
A. The problem of uncovered out-of-pocket costs is predominantly a problem of low-
income individuals. Low-income seniors actually have lower medical costs on 
average than other seniors, but they have far fewer cash and insurance resources 
to apply to them. Medicare beneficiaries with an income less than 135 percent 
FPL spend 33 percent of their annual income on out-of-pocket health care costs, 
on average, while those above 200 percent FPL spend only 12 percent. 
 
B. Enhanced savings will only be a partial solution to this problem for low-income 
seniors. Even with a matching subsidy, low-income individuals who saved 1 
percent of their income tax free from age 50 on would on average save enough to 
pay for about a year of Medigap for poor and near-poor seniors (incomes under 
150% FPL), and three years of Medigap for lower-middle-income seniors. 
Because their preretirement incomes are low on average, helping low-income 
individuals to save will not fully address the problem of out-of pocket medical 
costs for the low-income elderly. Nevertheless, particularly given the low savings 
levels of the poor and near-poor, savings on the order of 1 percent of income 
could make a real difference in relative terms. 
 
C. A policy allowing near-retirees to save for post-retirement medical expenses tax 
free is likely to appeal to both low-income and higher-income individuals. Low-
income and lower-middle-income populations do participate in appreciable 
numbers in tax-advantaged retirement savings in their 50s and 60s, while higher-
income populations participate in these programs at higher rates. If patterns from 
other savings incentives programs would hold for a similar program targeted at 
medical costs, between 20 percent and 40 percent of low-income people would 
participate, with participation on the higher end of that range among those with 
incomes between 150 percent and 300 percent FPL. There is evidence that a 
public matching subsidy would be a critical element to attracting low-income 
participation. Participation rates for individuals with average and higher incomes 
are likely to be 50 percent or more. 
 
D. There is a strong fiscal case for partly or totally limiting any tax incentives for 
post-retirement medical costs to low-income and lower-middle-income 
individuals. The policy problem of uncovered post-retirement medical costs is far 
more acute in this population. A universal option to save a percentage of income 
for post-retirement medical costs tax free would cost $18 in lost tax revenue for 
 19
 every dollar saved. In contrast, allowing only those with incomes of 300 percent 
FPL or less to shelter savings from taxation would reduce the tax revenue loss to 
the federal budget to $8 of every $100 saved. A more modest form of means-
testing would allow tax incentives to apply almost universally but still reduce 
costs: applying the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) to income saved and 
denying eligibility for the highest 3 percent of earners who do not pay the AMT 
would reduce the percent of total income potentially subject to sheltering by about 
38 percent, and would reduce budgetary impacts by close to 50 percent. 
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 APPENDIX A. DETAILED PROJECTIONS OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND HOLDINGS 
 
We generated estimated account holdings at age 65 for individuals in the following 
preretirement income level categories: less than 100 percent FPL, 100 to 149 percent 
FPL, 150 to 199 percent FPL, 200 to 299 percent FPL and greater than 300 percent FPL. 
That is, our focus is on low-income and lower-middle-income individuals (about one-
third of individuals ages 50 to 65 have incomes of less than 300 percent FPL25). We use 
the latest available (2002) HRS data to generate anticipated dollar inputs into accounts 
from age of first investment until retirement, and select a “program start year” (that is, the 
year when participants would begin funding accounts) of 2007. We project account 
holdings under different assumptions: varying by age of initial contribution, investment 
level, and with or without a partial match for low-income participants. 
 
Table A-1a. Average Annual Pretax Contribution by Income Level 
 Current Family Income as Percentage of FPL 
Year <100 100–149 150–199 200–299 >300 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 60, 0.5% of Income 
2007 $35 $87 $129 $162 $519 
2008 $36 $89 $132 $166 $532 
2009 $36 $91 $135 $170 $544 
2010 $36 $91 $135 $170 $543 
2011 $36 $91 $135 $169 $542 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 60, 1% of Income 
2007 $70 $174 $258 $324 $1,039 
2008 $71 $178 $264 $332 $1,063 
2009 $73 $182 $271 $340 $1,088 
2010 $73 $182 $270 $340 $1,087 
2011 $73 $181 $269 $339 $1,084 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 50, 0.5% of Income 
2007 $40 $91 $141 $211 $593 
2008 $41 $94 $146 $219 $616 
2009 $43 $98 $152 $228 $640 
2010 $44 $100 $156 $233 $656 
2011 $45 $103 $160 $239 $671 
2012 $46 $105 $163 $245 $688 
2013 $47 $108 $167 $251 $704 
2014 $48 $110 $171 $257 $720 
2015 $48 $110 $171 $256 $719 
2016 $48 $110 $170 $255 $717 
2017 $48 $109 $170 $254 $714 
2018 $47 $109 $169 $253 $709 
2019 $47 $108 $167 $250 $703 
2020 $46 $107 $166 $248 $697 
2021 $46 $105 $164 $245 $688 
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  Current Family Income as Percentage of FPL 
Year <100 100–149 150–199 200–299 >300 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 50, 1% of Income 
2007 $79 $182 $282 $423 $1,187 
2008 $82 $189 $293 $439 $1,232 
2009 $85 $196 $304 $456 $1,280 
2010 $88 $201 $312 $467 $1,311 
2011 $90 $206 $319 $478 $1,343 
2012 $92 $210 $327 $490 $1,375 
2013 $94 $215 $335 $501 $1,408 
2014 $96 $220 $342 $513 $1,441 
2015 $96 $220 $342 $512 $1,439 
2016 $96 $220 $341 $511 $1,435 
2017 $95 $219 $339 $509 $1,428 
2018 $95 $217 $337 $505 $1,419 
2019 $94 $215 $334 $501 $1,407 
2020 $93 $213 $331 $496 $1,393 
2021 $92 $211 $327 $490 $1,376 
 
 
Table A-1b. Accumulated Pretax Contribution by Income Level 
  Current Family Income as Percentage of FPL 
 
Year 
Intermediate 
Rate 
 
<100 
 
100–149 
 
150–199 
 
200–299 
 
>300 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 60, 0.5% of Income 
2007 5.6% $136 $169 $170 $543 $548 
2008 5.9% $272 $337 $339 $1,085 $1,144 
2009 5.9% $272 $337 $339 $1,085 $1,788 
2010 5.9% $533 $660 $663 $2,124 $2,469 
2011 5.9% $800 $991 $996 $3,188 $3,188 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 60, 1% of Income  
2007 5.6% $273 $338 $340 $1,087 $1,097 
2008 5.9% $545 $675 $678 $2,171 $2,288 
2009 5.9% $545 $675 $678 $2,171 $3,575 
2010 5.9% $681 $851 $889 $2,764 $4,937 
2011 5.9% $823 $1,034 $1,109 $3,380 $6,376 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 50, 0.5% of Income  
2007 5.6% $151 $195 $233 $656 $627 
2008 5.9% $305 $394 $473 $1,327 $1,316 
2009 5.9% $463 $598 $717 $2,015 $2,072 
2010 5.9% $624 $808 $968 $2,718 $2,888 
2011 5.9% $789 $1,022 $1,225 $3,439 $3,770 
2012 5.8% $955 $1,235 $1,481 $4,158 $4,716 
2013 5.8% $1,119 $1,448 $1,736 $4,875 $5,734 
2014 5.8% $1,283 $1,660 $1,991 $5,589 $6,828 
2015 5.8% $1,446 $1,871 $2,243 $6,299 $7,986 
2016 5.8% $1,608 $2,080 $2,494 $7,002 $9,208 
2017 5.8% $1,768 $2,287 $2,742 $7,699 $10,497 
2018 5.8% $1,926 $2,491 $2,987 $8,387 $11,856 
2019 5.8% $1,926 $2,491 $2,987 $8,387 $13,288 
2020 5.8% $2,198 $2,844 $3,409 $9,573 $14,796 
2021 5.8% $2,481 $3,210 $3,848 $10,806 $16,382 
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   Current Family Income as Percentage of FPL 
 
Year 
Intermediate 
Rate 
 
<100 
 
100–149 
 
150–199 
 
200–299 
 
>300 
Estimated Contribution Beginning at Age 50, 1% of Income  
2007 5.6% $301 $390 $467 $1,311 $1,253 
2008 5.9% $609 $788 $945 $2,654 $2,632 
2009 5.9% $925 $1,197 $1,435 $4,029 $4,143 
2010 5.9% $1,248 $1,615 $1,936 $5,437 $5,776 
2011 5.9% $1,579 $2,043 $2,449 $6,877 $7,539 
2012 5.8% $1,909 $2,470 $2,962 $8,316 $9,431 
2013 5.8% $2,239 $2,897 $3,473 $9,751 $11,467 
2014 5.8% $2,567 $3,321 $3,981 $11,179 $13,657 
2015 5.8% $2,892 $3,742 $4,486 $12,598 $15,971 
2016 5.8% $3,215 $4,160 $4,987 $14,004 $18,415 
2017 5.8% $3,535 $4,574 $5,483 $15,397 $20,994 
2018 5.8% $3,851 $4,983 $5,973 $16,774 $23,713 
2019 5.8% $3,851 $4,983 $5,973 $16,774 $26,576 
2020 5.8% $3,851 $4,983 $5,973 $16,774 $29,592 
2021 5.8% $3,851 $4,983 $5,973 $16,774 $32,764 
 
We have generated projections based on two possibilities for ages at which 
participants could begin to fund their accounts—at age 50 and age 60. We therefore 
estimate contributions over two time periods: 2007 to 2011 (five years) for those starting 
at 60 and 2007 to 2021 (15 years) for those starting at 50.26 This model proposal allows 
individuals to invest up to 1 percent of pretax income. We project holdings at 65 for 
people funding accounts at either 1 percent of income or at 0.5 percent of income. 
 
We then multiply the principal and any accrued interest by the compounded rate 
of return of the Medicare Part A Trust Fund under the Trustees’ most recent intermediate 
rate projections. We report our raw data—year-by-year projections of annual 
contributions and compounded accumulated account totals. Notably, while the Medicare 
Trustees project 5.1 percent annual medical inflation, they project slightly less than 5.9 
percent annual returns for the Trust Fund.27 An additional important note is that average 
incomes tend to go down as individuals approach 65, as some take early retirement. 
 
Because a savings account based entirely on income has regressive economic effects, 
we also model account holdings with a public matching subsidy for low-income contributors. 
We use the Earned Income Tax Credit as a rough guide for subsidy levels for low-income 
beneficiaries. Following the EITC phase out in simplified form, we built in a 50 percent 
match on all contributions made by individuals with incomes at Federal Poverty Level or 
less and a 25 percent match on all contributions made by individuals with incomes between 
100 percent and 149 percent FPL. (Presumably, the actual phase out from a 50 percent 
match to a 25 percent match would be less abrupt.) Approximately 15 percent of the population 
ages 50 to 64 has an income in this range and would be eligible for such a subsidy. 
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 Figure A-1 display projected account holdings at age 65 under all of the 
permutations described above. 
 
 
Figure A-1. Projected Holdings at Age 65
by Percentage of FPL and Under Alternative Assumptions
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED PROJECTIONS OF HOLDINGS VS. COSTS 
 
Using the average annual pretax contribution projections at the 0.5 and 1.0 percent 
income investment levels and under the 5- and 15-year investment scenarios reported in 
Table A-1b, we compare the average prefunded account accumulation for each income 
level to various projected long-term care costs. We detail how account holdings may 
offset projected average annual out-of-pocket health care and Medigap Plan F premium 
costs for individuals by relative income level. 
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 Table B-1a. Full Prefunded Account Projections 
Under 5-Year Investment Scenario by Income, and Investment Rate 
Average Prefunded Account Accumulation by Income Level, 2011 
 
Percentage 
of FPL 
5-Year, 0.5% 
Unsubsidized 
Investment 
5-Year, 1.0% 
Unsubsidized 
Investment 
5-Year, 0.5% 
Subsidized 
Investment 
5-Year, 1.0% 
Subsidized 
Investment 
<100* $213 $427 $314 $628 
100–149** $533 $1,067 $660 $1,319 
150–199 $793 $1,585 $793 $1,585 
200–299 $996 $1,992 $996 $1,992 
>300 $3,188 $6,376 $3,188 $6,376 
* subsidized annually at the 50% level; ** subsidized annually at the 25% level. 
 
Table B-1b. Full Prefunded Account Projections 
Under 15-Year Investment Scenario by Income, and Investment Rate 
Average Prefunded Account Accumulation by Income Level, 2021 
 
Percentage 
of FPL 
15-Year, 0.5% 
Unsubsidized 
Investment 
15-Year, 1.0% 
Unsubsidized 
Investment 
15-Year, 0.5% 
Subsidized 
Investment 
15-Year, 1.0% 
Subsidized 
Investment 
<100* $1,093 $2,187 $1,610 $3,220 
100–149** $2,507 $5,015 $3,100 $6,200 
150–199 $3,893 $7,787 $3,893 $7,787 
200–299 $5,834 $11,668 $5,834 $11,668 
>300 $16,382 $32,764 $16,382 $32,764 
* subsidized annually at the 50% level; ** subsidized annually at the 25% level. 
 
Figure B-1 compares accumulated account holdings and projected costs for 
individuals with annual incomes less than 100 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure B-1. Subsidized* Account Holdings
and Average Annual Costs for Individuals
Under 100% of Federal Poverty Level
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15-year
investment,
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investment,
1.0% of income
Accumulated pretax contribution at 0.5% or 1.0% of income
* Subsidized annually at the 50% level.  
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 Figure B-2 shows accumulated account holdings and projected costs for 
individuals with incomes between 100 and 149 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure B-2. Subsidized* Account Holdings
and Average Annual Costs for Individuals
at 100%–149% of Federal Poverty Level
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* Subsidized annually at the 25% level.  
 
Figure B-3 shows accumulated account holdings and projected costs for 
individuals with incomes between 150 and 199 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure B-3. Unsubsidized Account Holdings
and Average Annual Costs for Individuals
at 150%–199% of Federal Poverty Level
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 Figure B-4 shows accumulated account holdings and projected costs for 
individuals with incomes between 200 and 299 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure B-4. Unsubsidized Account Holdings
and Average Annual Costs for Individuals
at 200%–300% of Federal Poverty Level
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Figure B-5 shows accumulated account holdings and projected costs for 
individuals with incomes greater than 300 percent of the FPL. 
 
Figure B-5. Unsubsidized Account Holdings
and Average Annual Costs for Individuals
Above 300% of Federal Poverty Level
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